

Duality, Free Boundaries, Optimal Nonlinear Pricing

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Outline

- 1 Monopolist's problem
- 2 Examples and History
- 3 Hypotheses
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- 5 New duality certifying solutions
- 6 A free boundary problem hidden in Rochet-Choné's square example
- 7 A regularity result: Lipschitz product selection
- 8 Conclusions

Monopolist's problem

Given compact sets $X \subset \mathbf{R}^m$, $Y \subset \mathbf{R}^n$, and 'direct utility'

$b(x, y)$ = value of product $y \in Y$ to buyer $x \in X$

$c(y)$ = monopolist's cost to produce $y \in Y$

$d\mu(x)$ = relative frequency of buyer $x \in X$ (as compared to $x' \in X$)

Monopolist's problem: choose price menu $v : Y \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ to maximize profits

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$$\tilde{\Pi}(v) := \int_X [v(y_v(x)) - c(y_v(x))] d\mu(x), \quad \text{where}$$

Agent x 's problem: choose $y_v(x)$ to maximize

$$y_v(x) \in \arg \max_{y \in Y} b(x, y) - v(y)$$

Constrain: v lower semicontinuous, $0 \in Y$ and $v(0) = 0 = c(0) = b(x, 0)$.

Examples

- airline ticket pricing
- insurance
- educational signaling
- optimal taxation: replace profit maximization with a budget constraint for providing services

Some history:


Mirrlees '71, Spence '73 ($n = 1 = m$): $\frac{\partial^2 b}{\partial x \partial y} > 0$ implies $\frac{dy_v}{dx} \geq 0$

Rochet-Choné '98 ($n = m > 1$): $b(x, y) = x \cdot y$ bilinear implies $y_v(x) = Dv^*(x)$ convex gradient; bunching

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Rochet-Choné '98 ($n = m > 1$): $b(x, y) = x \cdot y$ bilinear implies $y_v(x) = Dv^*(x)$ convex gradient; bunching for $c(y) = \frac{1}{2}|y|^2$



Basov '03 control theoretic approach; Carlier-Lachand-Robert '03:
 $v^* \in C^1(\text{spt } \mu)$; Caffarelli-Lions '06+ (unpublished) $v^* \in C_{loc}^{1,1}(X^0)$

Carlier '01: $b(x, y)$ general implies existence of optimizer $v = (v^b)^{\tilde{b}}$

Chen '13: $u \in C^1(X)$ under Ma-Trudinger-Wang (MTW) conditions, with

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called the 'indirect utility' to shopper x (and $\tilde{b}(y, x) = b(x, y)$)

Figalli-Kim-M. '11:

convexity of principal's problem under strengthening of (MTW) on $b(x, y)$

M.-Rankin-Zhang '23+:

$c^b \in C^2$, $\log \frac{d\mu}{dx} \in C^1 \implies u = v^b \in C_{loc}^{1,1}(X^0)$ under same strengthening

Noldeke-Samuelsen (ECTA '18), Zhang (ET '19) M.-Zhang (CPAM '19):

generalize to preferences $G(x, y, z) \neq b(x, y) - z$ and profits

$\pi(x, y, z) \neq z - c(y)$ nonlinear in price $z \in \mathbf{R}$

Hypotheses (Ma-Trudinger-Wang type conditions)

(B0) $b \in C^4(X \times Y)$, $m = n$, and for each $x, x_0 \in X \subset \mathbf{R}^m$:

(B1) $y \in Y \mapsto D_x b(x, y) := (\frac{\partial b}{\partial x_1}, \dots, \frac{\partial b}{\partial x_m})$ is a **diffeomorphism**

(B2) with **convex** range $Y_x := D_x b(x, Y)$ and inverse $\bar{y}_b(\cdot, x) : Y_x \rightarrow Y$.

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DEFN: $t \in [0, 1] \mapsto (x, y_t) \in X \times Y$ is called a **b -segment** if

$$\frac{d^2}{dt^2} [D_x b(x, y_t)] = 0 \quad \forall t \in [0, 1]$$

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• Note: when $b(x, y) = x \cdot y$ the above function of t is **affine linear**

Monopolists problem in terms of buyers' indirect utilities u

$$u(x) := v^b(x) := \max_{y \in Y} b(x, y) - v(y) =: b(x, y_v(x)) - v(y_v(x)) \quad (1)$$

implies

$$Du(x) = D_x b(x, y_v(x))$$

so we identify

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and maximize

$$\tilde{\Pi}(v) = \int_X [v - c] \bar{y}_b(Du(x), x) d\mu(x)$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\Pi}(v) &= \int_X [v - c]_{\bar{y}_b(Du(x), x)} d\mu(x) \\ &= \int_X [b(x, y) - u(x) - c(y)]_{y=\bar{y}_b(Du(x), x)} d\mu(x) =: \Pi(u) \end{aligned}$$

among u of form (1) (i.e. among so called b -convex $u(\cdot) \geq 0$)

More Hypotheses and Notation

$$\max_{0 \leq u \in \mathcal{U}} \Pi(u)$$

where \mathcal{U} is the set of b -convex functions:

$$\mathcal{U} := \{u \mid u(\cdot) = \sup_{y \in Y} b(\cdot, y) - v(y) \text{ on } X \text{ for some } v : Y \rightarrow \mathbf{R} \cup \{+\infty\}\}$$

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$$(C0) \quad c \in C^0(Y)$$

$$(C1) \quad c = (c^b)^{\tilde{b}} \text{ is } \tilde{b}\text{-convex, where } \tilde{b}(y, x) = b(x, y)$$

$$(C2) \quad c^b \in C^2(X) \text{ (i.e. 2-uniform } \tilde{b}\text{-convexity of } c = c^{b\tilde{b}}).$$

Carlier '01: Given (B0-B1, C0) the maximum above is attained. If $\mu \ll \mathcal{L}^m$ the map $x \rightarrow \bar{y}_b(Du(x), x)$ gives the consumer to product correspondence.

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(b): If (B0-B3, C0-C2) hold then $\Pi(u)$ is 2-uniformly concave on $\mathcal{U} \subset W^{1,2}(X, d\mu)$.

If, in addition $\mu \ll \mathcal{L}^m$ the principal's optimal strategy u is unique μ -a.e. and stable:

i.e. $(b_i, c_i, \mu_i) \rightarrow (b_\infty, c_\infty, \mu_\infty)$ in $C^2 \times C^0 \times (C^0)^*$ implies $u_i \rightarrow u_\infty$ in $L^\infty(d\mu_\infty)$

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
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- the Rochet-Choné $b(x, y) = x \cdot y$ lies on the boundary of the set of preferences satisfying (B3)
- if $\|A\|_{C^1} \leq 1, \|B\|_{C^1} \leq 1$ with A convex, $b(x, y) = x \cdot y - A(x)B(y)$ satisfies (B3) if and only if B is convex
- Kim-M. '10: curvature interpretation of (B3) when $\tilde{b}(y, x) = b(x, y)$ also satisfies (B0-B2)

Pseudo-Riemannian geometry à la Kim-McCann '10



A new duality for bilinear preferences

Following [Rochet-Choné '98](#) choose $b(x, y) = x \cdot y$ and $X, Y \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ convex so

$$\Pi(u) = \int_X [x \cdot Du - u(x) - c(Du(x))] d\mu(x)$$

with

$$u(x) = v^*(x) := \sup_{y \in Y} x \cdot y - v(y)$$
$$\in \mathcal{U} := \{u : X \rightarrow [0, \infty] \text{ convex} \mid Du(X) \subset Y\}$$

THM ([M.-Zhang 23+](#)

c.f. [Kolesnikov-Sandomirskiy-Tsyvinski-Zimin 22+](#) on Beckmann auctions):

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$$\max_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \Pi(u) = \min_{S \in \mathcal{S}} \int c^*(S(x)) d\mu(x)$$

where

$$\mathcal{S} := \bigcap_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \left\{ S : X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^n \mid \int_X [(x - S(x)) \cdot Du - u(x)] d\mu(x) \leq 0 \right\}$$

Theorem

$$\max_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \Pi(u) = \min_{S \in \mathcal{S}} \int c^*(S(x)) d\mu(x)$$

where

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Proof: (\leq): $S \in \mathcal{S}$, $u \in \mathcal{U}$ and the definition of c^* imply

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(\geq) **Rockafellar-Fenchel** duality






Rochet-Choné's square example revisited; $c(y) = \frac{1}{2}|y|^2$

$$\mathcal{X} = [a, a+1]^2$$

$$d\mu(x) = \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{X}}(x) d^2x$$

DV^*



Rank $D^2V^* = k$ on \mathcal{I}_k
 $\forall 0, 1, 2, 3$

$$(D\mu^*)_{\#} \mu = \mathbb{1}_{\Omega_0} \delta_{(a,0)} + \nu_1 + \nu_2$$

$\gamma_k \ll \mathcal{H}^k$ on \mathcal{Y}_k $k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$

Variational calculus for obstacle problem plus convexity

$$u \in \underset{\text{convex } u \geq 0}{\arg \max} - \int_{X := [a, a+1]^2} \left(\frac{1}{2} |Du(x) - x|^2 + u - \frac{1}{2} |x|^2 \right) d\mu(x)$$

gives $u = u_i$ on $\Omega_i = \{x \mid \text{Rank}(D^2u(x)) = i\}$ where

- on Ω_0 exclusion: $u_0 = 0$

- on Ω_1 , Euler-Lagrange ODE: if $2u_1(x_1, x_2) =: k(x_1 + x_2)$ then

$$k(s) = \frac{3}{4}s^2 - as - \log |s - 2a| + \text{const}$$

subject to boundary conditions $u_1 = u_0$ and $Du_1 = Du_0$ at lower boundary.

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- on Ω_2 Euler-Lagrange PDE: $\Delta u_2 = 3$ subject to boundary conditions

$$(Du_2(x) - x) \cdot \hat{n}_{\Omega_2}(x) = 0 \quad \text{on} \quad \partial X \cap \bar{\Omega}_2$$

$$(Du_2 - Du_1) \cdot \hat{n}_{\Omega_2}(x) = 0 \quad \text{on} \quad \partial\Omega_2 \cap \partial\Omega_1 \quad (\text{Neumann})$$

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$$u_2 = u_1 \quad \text{on} \quad \partial\Omega_2 \cap \partial\Omega_1 \quad (\text{Dirichlet})$$

OVERDETERMINED!





Fig. 1 Numerical approximation U of the solution of the classical Monopolist's problem (1), computed on a 50×50 grid. *Left* level sets of U , with $U = 0$ in white. *Center left* level sets of $\det(\nabla^2 U)$ (with again $U = 0$ in white); note the degenerate region Ω_1 where $\det(\nabla^2 U) = 0$. *Center right* distribution of products sold by the monopolist. *Right* profit margin of the monopolist for each type of product (margins are low on the one dimensional part of the product line, at the *bottom left*). Color scales on Fig. 10 (color figure online)



c.f. Boerma-Tsyvinski-Zimin 22+ blunt Ω_1^0 v targeted Ω_1^+ bunching

Free boundary problem

$u = u_i$ on Ω_i where

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- on Ω_1^0 , **Rochet-Choné's** ODE: $u_1(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{2}k(x_1 + x_2)$ where

$$k(s) = \frac{3}{4}s^2 - as - \log|s - 2a| + \text{const}$$

subject to boundary conditions $k = 0$ and $k' = 0$ at **lower boundary**.

- on Ω_1^+ , $u_1 = u_1^+$ given by a **NEW** system of ODE (for height $h(\cdot)$ and length $R(\cdot)$ of isochoice segments together with profile of $u_1^+(\cdot)$ along them), with boundary conditions

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
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- on Ω_2 , PDE: $\Delta u_2 = 3$ with **Rochet-Choné's overdetermined** conditions

$$(Du_2(x) - x) \cdot \hat{n}_{\Omega_2}(x) = 0 \quad \text{on} \quad \partial X \cap \bar{\Omega}_2 \quad \text{and on} \quad \{x_1 = x_2\}$$

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Precise Euler-Lagrange equation in the 'missing' region Ω_1^+

Index each isochoice segment in Ω_1^+ by its angle $\theta \geq -\frac{\pi}{4}$ to horizontal. Let $(a, h(\theta))$ denote its left-hand endpoint and parameterize the segment by distance $r \in [0, R(\theta)]$ to $(a, h(\theta))$. Along this segment of length $R(\theta)$,

$$u_1^+ \left((a, h(\theta)) + r(\cos \theta, \sin \theta) \right) = m(\theta)r + b(\theta).$$

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For $\underline{h} \in [a, a+1]$, $R : [-\frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{2}] \rightarrow [0, a\sqrt{2})$ with $R(-\frac{\pi}{4}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\underline{h} - a)$, solve

$$(m''(\theta) + m(\theta) - 2R(\theta))(m'(\theta) \sin \theta - m(\theta) \cos \theta + a) = \frac{3}{2}R^2(\theta) \cos \theta \quad (2)$$

$$m(-\frac{\pi}{4}) = 0, \quad m'(-\frac{\pi}{4}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}k'(a + \underline{h}).$$

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Index each isochoice segment in Ω_1^+ by its angle $\theta \geq -\frac{\pi}{4}$ to horizontal. Let $(a, h(\theta))$ denote its left-hand endpoint and parameterize the segment by distance $r \in [0, R(\theta)]$ to $(a, h(\theta))$. Along this segment of length $R(\theta)$,

$$u_1^+ \left((a, h(\theta)) + r(\cos \theta, \sin \theta) \right) = m(\theta)r + b(\theta).$$

For $\underline{h} \in [a, a+1]$, $R : [-\frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{2}] \rightarrow [0, a\sqrt{2})$ with $R(-\frac{\pi}{4}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\underline{h} - a)$, solve

$$(m''(\theta) + m(\theta) - 2R(\theta))(m'(\theta) \sin \theta - m(\theta) \cos \theta + a) = \frac{3}{2}R^2(\theta) \cos \theta \quad (2)$$

$$m(-\frac{\pi}{4}) = 0, \quad m'(-\frac{\pi}{4}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}k'(a + \underline{h}). \quad \text{Then set} \quad (3)$$

$$h(t) = \underline{h} + \frac{1}{3} \int_{-\pi/4}^t (m''(\theta) + m(\theta) - 2R(\theta)) \frac{d\theta}{\cos \theta}, \quad (4)$$

$$b(t) = \frac{1}{2}k(a + \underline{h}) + \int_{-\pi/4}^t (m'(\theta) \cos \theta + m(\theta) \sin \theta) h'(\theta) d\theta. \quad (5)$$

- for $\underline{h} \in [a, a + 1]$, $R : [-\frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{2}] \rightarrow [0, a\sqrt{2})$ Lipschitz (say) and $R(-\frac{\pi}{4}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\underline{h} - a)$ we can solve (2)–(5) to find Ω_1^+ and u_+^1 .
- we can then solve the resulting Neumann problem for $\Delta u_2 = 3$ on Ω_2
- while it is not yet *rigorously* proved is that some choice of \underline{h} and $R(\cdot)$ also yields $u_1 - u_2 = \text{const}$ on $\partial\Omega_2 \setminus \partial X$,

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- if a choice exists such that, absorbing the constant into u_2 , the resulting u given by $u_i^{(\pm)}$ on $\Omega_i^{(\pm)}$ for $i \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ is in \mathcal{U} , our **new duality** can be used to certify that u is the desired **optimizer**

WHY DO WE EXPECT SUCH A CHOICE TO EXIST?

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WHY DO WE EXPECT SUCH A CHOICE TO EXIST?

- a unique optimizer $\bar{u} \in \mathcal{U}$ is known to exist (Rochet-Choné) and $\bar{u} \in C_{loc}^{1,1}(X^0)$ (Caffarelli-Lions); if the sets Ω_i where its Hessian is rank i are **smooth enough**, and Ω_1 has the expected **3 components**, then (2)–(5) and the **overdetermined** Poisson problem $\Delta u_2 = 3$ must be satisfied
- but maybe Ω_i are not smooth enough, or Ω_1 is not (simply) connected and/or has more than three components Ω_1^0, Ω_1^\pm (some too small for the numerics to resolve); we doubt this, but can't rule it out rigorously yet...

Theorem (M.-Rankin-Zhang 23+)

If b and $\tilde{b}(y, x) = b(x, y)$ both satisfy (B0-B3), c satisfies (C0-C2) and $d\mu(x) = f(x)dx$ with $\log f \in C^{0,1}$ then $u \in C_{loc}^{1,1}(X^0)$.

- map from buyer to product types is locally Lipschitz!
- extends Caffarelli-Lions '06+ to b & c non-quadratic
- improves Chen '13 from C_{loc}^1 to $C_{loc}^{1,1}$
- **sharp**: examples for $n = 1 = m$ show $u \notin C_{loc}^2(X^0)$
- idea: use energetic comparison to pinch u between parabolas

Lemma (Geometry of a carefully chosen trial function)

Given $\delta > 0$, there exists $C_0, C_1, C_2 > 0$ such that if $u = u^{\tilde{b}}$ is optimal and $d(x_0, \partial X) > \delta$ and $y_0 = \bar{y}_b(Du(x_0), x_0)$ then if $r < C_0$ and

$$h = \sup_{x \in B_r(x_0)} u(x) - [u(x_0) + b(x, y_0) - b(x_0, y_0)] > 0$$

then some $A(\cdot) = b(\cdot, y') + a'$ makes $S := \{x \in X \mid u < A\}$ a neighbourhood of x_0 (contained in a strip of width $2r$) with

$$\sup_{x \in S} A(x) - u(x) \leq h$$

and

$$0 \geq \frac{1}{|S|} \int_S \left[c(y) - b(x, y) \right]_{y=y'}^{y=\bar{y}(Du(x), x)} f(x) dx \geq -C_1 h + C_2 \frac{h^2}{r^2}.$$

CONCLUSIONS

- **Concavity**, when present, is a powerful tool for optimization
- for numerics, uniqueness, stability, and characterization of optimum
- **Duality** of price menu $v(y)$ with buyers' indirect utilities $u(x) = v^b(x)$
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for **concavity** of monopolist's problem (as a function of u)
- and a sharp smoothness result $u \in C_{loc}^{1,1}(X^0)$
- Related to **curvature conditions** governing **regularity** in optimal transport problems (à la **Ma-Trudinger-Wang** and **Kim-McCann**)
- **new duality** certifying solutions for bilinear benefit $b(x, y) = x \cdot y$
- square example requires solving an unexpected **free boundary** problem

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THANK YOU!